India’s Balancing Act
Modi’s visit to Tianjin for the SCO summit was more than optics. It underlined India’s strategy of poly-alignment, balancing China, Russia, and the West while navigating fragile borders and rising expectations.
When Indian prime minister Narendra Modi confirmed he would attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin recently, you could actually hear the sound of analysts’ raised eyebrows. It was his first visit to China in years, following military clashes along the Himalayan border and what has been a prolonged chill in bilateral ties. Yet on 31 August, Modi sat at the same table as Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, a coterie of Central Asian presidents, and even UN Secretary-General António Guterres.
India’s presence, however, was not just symbolic, but a calculated signal that New Delhi intends to hedge its bets and keep a seat at every major table, even when the chairs may be a little… uncomfortable. In an emerging era of increasingly fluid alignments, India is performing a delicate balancing act, one that says as much about the fracturing world order as it does about India’s ambitions within it.
What India wanted in Tianjin
For New Delhi, the SCO is both a challenge and an opportunity. Founded in 2001, the grouping has grown into a Eurasian forum that spans nearly half the world’s population, with members including China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and most of Central Asia. India joined in 2017 alongside Pakistan, a move that institutionalized their ongoing rivalry even as it expanded India’s reach.
In Tianjin, Modi’s team sought visibility, reminding Beijing, Moscow, and Washington alike that India remains indispensable. They also aimed for pragmatism, keeping regional security cooperation alive through mechanisms such as the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure in Tashkent. They also worked on narrative, positioning India as a civilizational power, sure of itself and equally at ease engaging across divides. For a government that only recently hosted the G20 in New Delhi, showing up at the SCO was also about consistency, this was a branding initiative to reinforce India’s message that it will attend both Western-led and Eurasian forums, and will refuse to be forced to take a single side.
In any case, the Reuters curtain-raiser noted that the optics alone of Modi seated beside Xi were enough to reset the swirl of diplomatic speculation (Reuters).
Border realities and strategic mistrust
This performative engagement is, however, complicated by realities on the ground. The Line of Actual Control (LAC), the disputed frontier with China, remains militarily tense. Since the deadly Galwan Valley clash in 2020, both sides have fortified positions, built additional infrastructure, and rotated troops through high-altitude flashpoints. This is, in all respects, a military hot zone, and even as Modi and Xi shook hands in Tianjin, Indian media reported that disengagement talks had stalled yet again (Economic Times).
India cannot afford to ignore these tensions, nor can it afford to reduce all diplomacy with Beijing to that of border management. Instead, New Delhi is trying first to compartmentalize: contest China at the border, yes; compete in the Indo-Pacific, of course; and cooperate in multilateral forums. It is an uneasy mix, but one that India believes is better in practice than opting for diplomatic isolation.
Russia: awkward partner, but still useful
The SCO also underlined India’s relationship with Russia, now strained by Moscow’s deepening ties with Beijing. Russia remains India’s biggest arms supplier, though some diversification is underway. At Tianjin, Modi used sideline meetings to keep channels open, hedging against overdependence on Western defense partners.
This seesaw has been described by Carnegie India as India’s “strategic insurance”: staying close enough to Moscow to avoid encirclement by a China-Russia bloc, all the while gradually reducing reliance on Russian kit. The SCO setting provided cover for this balancing act, framed as multilateral rather than bilateral maneuvering (Carnegie India).
Central Asia: the quiet frontier of influence
Often overlooked, Central Asia was a key subtext in Tianjin. As it always has in the past, the region sits at the crossroads of diverse geopolitical currents: China’s Belt and Road projects, Russian security guarantees, and India’s own posturing for energy and connectivity. For Delhi, political clout and visibility in Astana, Tashkent, and Bishkek matters, not least because Pakistan sits at the same table.
India has promoted the International North–South Transport Corridor and signaled interest in Central Asian renewables, yet the stark geography at the Roof of the World remains unflinchingly cruel: without direct land access through Pakistan, India depends on fragile routes via Iran. The SCO is one of the few consistent venues where Central Asian leaders see India as a player, not just a distant observer.
Poly-alignment: strategy or stopgap?
India’s presence in Tianjin fits a wider pattern scholars now call “poly-alignment”: engaging in multiple, overlapping partnerships without strict allegiance as seen via traditional bilateral agreement frameworks. This is more than hedging; it is a deliberate method of gaining flexibility in a fractured system.
In its relations with the United States and its partners, India pushes Indo-Pacific cooperation and defense modernization. In its links with Russia and China, India maintains legacy ties and access to Eurasian forums. And with the Global South, India emphasizes a sense of connective solidarity, South-South cooperation, development finance, and a growing notion of regional leadership.
Critics argue that this spreads India’s political clout too thinly. Supporters, on the other hand, counter that in a world without a single specific center of gravity, poly-alignment is not a luxury but a quickly emerging necessity. In this respect, the SCO summit was a textbook case: India neither endorsed China’s narratives nor walked away, it simply showed up, extracted a large slice of visibility, and left with its options intact.
MERICS has noted that such poly-alignment reflects the very logic of today’s Eurasia: no clean blocs, only shifting coalitions, with Beijing and Moscow using the SCO to promote an alternative order and underscore that multipolarity shift (MERICS).
Domestic optics
Back home, Modi’s visit played strongly into domestic politics. Indian outlets portrayed his handshake with Xi as both firm and pragmatic, a sign of India’s stature, whereas opposition voices accused the government of glossing over the urgency of addressing border disputes in pursuit of photo opportunities (Reuters).
For a leadership heading toward elections in 2026, this balancing act abroad mirrors balancing acts at home: how to project strength without inviting escalation, and how to claim pragmatism while absorbing criticism.
Why this matters beyond India
For outside observers, Tianjin may have offered a glimpse of the world to come. Yes, the United States may still dominate global financial and military structures at the present moment, but forums like the SCO show how alternative venues are gaining credence, and India’s willingness to engage both reflects and accelerates this shift.
If New Delhi can continue to work multiple rooms effectively, to navigate border disputes, domestic politics, trade opportunities, and geographic challenges, it may turn the great juggling act of poly-alignment into a durable strategy. If not, it risks physical overextension and a stern knock to its credibility, possibly from all sides.
Either way, we can be assured the Tianjin summit was no sideshow, rather, it was a snapshot of how major powers are now able to maneuver in a world where alliances have become fluid and influence is contested.
Read this. Notice that. Do something.
Read this: Reuters on Modi’s attendance (Reuters); the Astana Declaration 2024 for continuity (MEA); and Carnegie India’s overview of India-Russia stakes (Carnegie India).
Notice that: India cannot compartmentalize indefinitely. Watch how border tensions with China feed back into any outcome SCO language on security, and whether Moscow’s friendship tilt toward Beijing narrows India’s room for maneuver.
Do something: Add non-Western sources to your regular feed on Asia. Al Jazeera is a good start. Track India’s post-summit engagements with Central Asia and notice whether they move from optics to real projects within 90 days.
Previously on GYST
Next up: The “return of geopolitics” and the fracturing global order, tying some of our recent threads together.
